IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/ihs/ihsrop/56.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Voting Power and Coalition Formation: The Case of the Council of the EU

Author

Listed:
  • Levinsky, Rene

    (CERGEI-EI, Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education of Charles University and Economics Institute of the Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic)

  • Silarszky, Peter

    (CERGEI-EI, Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education of Charles University and Economics Institute of the Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic)

Abstract

In this paper we study the distribution of power in the Council of the European Union (EU). The goal of this paper is to evaluate the voting power of the member states after the entry of Central and Eastern European Countries (CEEC). The analysis is based on the Shapley-Shubik power index of simple cooperative games. Modified versions of the Shapley-Shubik index are used to analyse the influence of sub-systems of the EU on the distribution of power in the decision making process.

Suggested Citation

  • Levinsky, Rene & Silarszky, Peter, 1998. "Voting Power and Coalition Formation: The Case of the Council of the EU," East European Series 56, Institute for Advanced Studies.
    • Handle: RePEc:ihs:ihsrop:56
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.ihs.ac.at/publications/eco/east/ro-56.pdf
    File Function: First version, 1998
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Bas van Aarle & Jacob Engwerda & Joseph Plasmans, 2002. "Monetary and Fiscal Policy Interaction in the EMU: A Dynamic Game Approach," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 109(1), pages 229-264, January.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    EU Enlargement; EU Decision Making; A Priori Unions; Shapley; Value;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ihs:ihsrop:56. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Doris Szoncsitz (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/deihsat.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.