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L'Entreprise Publique en Concurrence : les Oligopoles Mixtes

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  • De Donder, Philippe

Abstract

[eng] A Survey of the Mixed Oligopoly Literature We present a survey of the literature on mixed oligopoly, defined as markets where a small number of firms are active and where firms with different objectives coexist. The main part of the analysis focuses on the competition between private, profit-maximizing firms and public, social-welfare maximizing firms. We show when the intervention of a public firm is welfare-improving, what the optimal share of public ownership in a partially private firm is, and what the objectives of a public firm, or of its managers, should be. We also study the competition between profit-maximizing and employee-controlled firms. We show how results differ according to whether the goods produced are homogenous or differentiated. [fre] Philippe De Donder L'entreprise publique en concurrence : les oligopoles mixtes. Cet article procède à une revue de la littérature portant sur les oligopoles mixtes, c'est-à-dire les marchés dans lesquels un bien ou service est fourni par un petit nombre d'entreprises qui n'ont pas toutes le même objectif. Les principaux objectifs étudiés sont la maximisation du profit et du bien-être. Nous présentons notamment les conditions sous lesquelles il est optimal d'avoir au moins une entreprise publique, la part optimale d'actions qui devrait être détenue par l'autorité publique dans une entreprise mixte, ainsi que les objectifs qui devraient être assignés aux entreprises publiques et à leurs managers. Nous étudions également la coexistence d'entreprises maximisant leur profit et d'entreprises autogérées. Nous contrastons les résultats obtenus quand les entreprises offrent des biens homogènes ou différenciés.
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  • De Donder, Philippe, 2005. "L'Entreprise Publique en Concurrence : les Oligopoles Mixtes," IDEI Working Papers 338, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
    • Handle: RePEc:ide:wpaper:4229
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Fatima Barros, 1994. "Delegation and Efficiency in a Mixed Oligopoly," Annals of Economics and Statistics, GENES, issue 33, pages 51-72.
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    Cited by:

    1. Sami Debbichi & Walid Hichri, 2013. "Threshold of Preference for Collusion and Interconnection Fees in Different Market Structures : the Tunisian Mobile Market Case," Working Papers halshs-00794286, HAL.
    2. Sami Debbichi & Walid Hichri, 2014. "Market Power and Collusion on Interconnection Phone Market in Tunisia : What Lessons from International Experiences," Working Papers halshs-00956638, HAL.
    3. repec:ipg:wpaper:2014-580 is not listed on IDEAS
    4. Sylvain Kadohognon Ouattara, 2011. "Incitations à fusionner dans un oligopole mixte asymétrique," Economics Working Paper Archive (University of Rennes & University of Caen) 201126, Center for Research in Economics and Management (CREM), University of Rennes, University of Caen and CNRS.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D21 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Theory
    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection

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