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Predatory Pricing in an Oligopolistic Framework

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Abstract

In this paper we study the nature of predatory behaviour in an oligopolistic framework. We use the long-purse story of financial vulnerability to demonstrate that predatory behaviour is less likely to occur in an oligopoly than in a monopoly. We show the nature of the free-rider problem, and illustrate the range of multiple equilibria that may exist in this situation. We also show how small firms may actually be less likely targets for predatory attacks than their larger, more efficient rivals.

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  • Dermot Nolan, 1998. "Predatory Pricing in an Oligopolistic Framework," Royal Holloway, University of London: Discussion Papers in Economics 98/4, Department of Economics, Royal Holloway University of London, revised Feb 1998.
    • Handle: RePEc:hol:holodi:9804
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