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Punishment and Counter-punishment in Public Goods Games: Can we still govern ourselves?

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Abstract

we characterise fiscal policy in terms of non-linear processes. We find that government spending and taxes can be described as being non-linear trend stationary processes instead of unit roots. A long run equilibrium relationship - a non-linear co-trend - does exist between the two series, fulfilling the intertemporal government budget constraint. We use Italian data spanning from 1861 to 1998.

Suggested Citation

  • Roberto Ricciuti, 2004. "Punishment and Counter-punishment in Public Goods Games: Can we still govern ourselves?," Royal Holloway, University of London: Discussion Papers in Economics 04/06, Department of Economics, Royal Holloway University of London, revised Apr 2004.
    • Handle: RePEc:hol:holodi:0406
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    taxes; government expenditure; intertemporal government budget constraint; non-linear trend stationarity; non-linear co-trending;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C22 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Single Equation Models; Single Variables - - - Time-Series Models; Dynamic Quantile Regressions; Dynamic Treatment Effect Models; Diffusion Processes
    • C32 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Multiple or Simultaneous Equation Models; Multiple Variables - - - Time-Series Models; Dynamic Quantile Regressions; Dynamic Treatment Effect Models; Diffusion Processes; State Space Models
    • E62 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Fiscal Policy; Modern Monetary Theory
    • H62 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - Deficit; Surplus

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