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From Political Power to Personal Wealth: Privatization, Elite Opportunity, and Social Stratification in Post-Reform China

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  • Duoduo Xu

    (Division of Social Science, The Hong Kong University of Science and Technology
    Institute for Advanced Study, The Hong Kong University of Science and Technology)

  • Xiaogang Wu

    (Division of Social Science, The Hong Kong University of Science and Technology
    Institute for Emerging Market Studies, Hong Kong University of Science and Technology)

Abstract

The impact of market transition on the changing order of social stratification in post-socialist regimes has been a highly prominent topic in sociology in recent decades. However, the debate has yielded no concrete conclusions, due in part to the lack of substantive institutional analysis. In this article, we aim to provide new answers to this age-old question by specifically examining how the economic opportunities available to former political elites have been shaped by the process of privatization. Based on firm-level data from a national representative survey on Chinese private enterprises, we show that nomenclatures in some regions successfully converted their political power into personal wealth by acquiring privatized firms, and the extent to which they could exploit the opportunities available to them was contingent upon how the privatization process was structured and regulated in a local context. Further analysis reveals important institutionalized inequality among private entrepreneurs, with former nomenclatures at the top of the social hierarchy in post-reform China.

Suggested Citation

  • Duoduo Xu & Xiaogang Wu, 2017. "From Political Power to Personal Wealth: Privatization, Elite Opportunity, and Social Stratification in Post-Reform China," HKUST IEMS Working Paper Series 2017-45, HKUST Institute for Emerging Market Studies, revised Aug 2017.
  • Handle: RePEc:hku:wpaper:201745
    as

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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    3. J. Kornai & E. Maskin & G. Roland, 2004. "Understanding the Soft Budget Constraint," Voprosy Ekonomiki, NP Voprosy Ekonomiki, issue 11.
    4. Xu, Cheng-Gang & Maskin, Eric, 2001. "Soft Budget Constraint Theories: From Centralization to the Market," CEPR Discussion Papers 2715, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    5. Hongbin Li & Scott Rozelle, 2003. "Privatizing Rural China: Insider Privatization, Innovative Contracts, and the Performance of Township Enterprises1," Discussion Papers 00001, Chinese University of Hong Kong, Department of Economics.
    6. repec:bla:etrans:v:9:y:2001:i:1:p:1-27 is not listed on IDEAS
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