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Rationality and the Nash Solution to Non-convex Bargaining Problems

Author

Listed:
  • Xu, Yongsheng
  • Yoshihara, Naoki
  • 吉原, 直毅
  • ヨシハラ, ナオキ

Abstract

Conditions α and β are two well-known rationality conditions in the theory of rational choice. This paper examines the implication of weaker versions of these two rationality conditions in the context of solutions to non-convex bargaining problems. It is shown that, together with the standard axioms of efficiency, anonymity and scale invariance, they characterize the Nash solution. This result makes a further connection between solutions to non-convex bargaining problems and rationalizability of choice functions in the theory of rational choice.

Suggested Citation

  • Xu, Yongsheng & Yoshihara, Naoki & 吉原, 直毅 & ヨシハラ, ナオキ, 2010. "Rationality and the Nash Solution to Non-convex Bargaining Problems," Discussion Paper Series a537, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
    • Handle: RePEc:hit:hituec:a537
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    File URL: https://hermes-ir.lib.hit-u.ac.jp/hermes/ir/re/18498/DP537.pdf
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations

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