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On the General Existence of Pure Strategy Political Competition Equilibrium in Multi-dimensional Party-Faction Models

Author

Listed:
  • Yoshihara, Naoki
  • 吉原, 直毅
  • ヨシハラ, ナオキ

Abstract

In this paper, we consider political competition games of two parties in multi-dimensional policy spaces, where the two parties have two factions, opportunists and militants, that intra-party bargain with each other. In such a game, we adopt the party-unanimity Nash equilibrium (PUNE) [Roemer (1998; 1999; 2001)] as an appropriate solution concept, and examine the general existence problem of this. In particular, we suppose that any faction of each party does not necessarily have dictatorial power. We then provide a general existence theorem for PUNE in this class of games.

Suggested Citation

  • Yoshihara, Naoki & 吉原, 直毅 & ヨシハラ, ナオキ, 2008. "On the General Existence of Pure Strategy Political Competition Equilibrium in Multi-dimensional Party-Faction Models," Discussion Paper Series a511, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
    • Handle: RePEc:hit:hituec:a511
    Note: First: January 2007; This version: October 2008
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    File URL: https://hermes-ir.lib.hit-u.ac.jp/hermes/ir/re/16360/DP511.pdf
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    multi-dimensional political competition games; partyunanimity Nash equilibria; pure-compromise PUNE;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C62 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Existence and Stability Conditions of Equilibrium
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation

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