IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/hig/wpaper/70-ec-2014.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

A Model Of Tacit Collusion: Nash-2 Equilibrium Concept

Author

Listed:
  • Marina S. Sandomirskaia

    (National Research University Higher School of Economics)

Abstract

We examine the novel concept for repeated noncooperative games with bounded rationality: \Nash-2" equilibrium, called also \threatening-proof pro le" in [16, Iskakov M., Iskakov A., 2012b]. It is weaker than Nash equilibrium and equilibrium in secure strategies: a player takes into account not only current strategies but also the next-stage responses of the partners to her deviation from the current situation that reduces her relevant choice set. We provide a condition for Nash-2 existence, criteria for a strategy pro le to be the Nash-2 equilibrium in strictly competitive games, apply this concept to Bertrand and Hotelling game and interpret the results as tacit collusion

Suggested Citation

  • Marina S. Sandomirskaia, 2014. "A Model Of Tacit Collusion: Nash-2 Equilibrium Concept," HSE Working papers WP BRP 70/EC/2014, National Research University Higher School of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:hig:wpaper:70/ec/2014
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.hse.ru/org/hse/wp/prepfr_EC
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Marina S. Sandomirskaia, 2015. "Price-Quantity Competition of Farsighted Firms: Toughness vs. Collusion," HSE Working papers WP BRP 93/EC/2015, National Research University Higher School of Economics.
    2. Iskakov, M., 2022. "Existence theorems for Nash equilibrium and equilibrium in secure strategies," Journal of the New Economic Association, New Economic Association, vol. 56(4), pages 12-27.
    3. Marina Sandomirskaia, 2019. "Nash-2 Equilibrium: Selective Farsightedness Under Uncertain Response," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 28(2), pages 275-304, April.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Nash-2 equilibrium; secure deviation; Bertrand paradox; Hotelling model; tacit collusion.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D03 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Behavioral Microeconomics: Underlying Principles
    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hig:wpaper:70/ec/2014. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Shamil Abdulaev or Shamil Abdulaev (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/hsecoru.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.