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Peer Review in Public Sector Organizations: A General Model and Empirical Evidence from a Survival Analysis

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  • Tim Jaekel

    (National Research University Higher School of Economics)

Abstract

In my paper I analyze why some top-level public administrators invite a peer review to learn about the strengths and weaknesses of their agencies while others do not. A peer review is a light-touch voluntary benchmarking exercise conducted by a group of critical friends (peers). I propose a general model from which I derive a series of hypotheses about the role of organizational size, performance gaps, peer effects and strategic interaction at individual and organizational-level decision making. For hypotheses tests I examine a unique dataset of participation in the Corporate Peer Challenge Program in England between 2010 and 2015. The estimation approach is survival analysis. I find that poor archival performance of a council and peer evaluations in neighboring councils are positively correlated with inviting a peer review. However, significance level of both effects is above 10 per cent.

Suggested Citation

  • Tim Jaekel, 2017. "Peer Review in Public Sector Organizations: A General Model and Empirical Evidence from a Survival Analysis," HSE Working papers WP BRP 05/PSP/2017, National Research University Higher School of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:hig:wpaper:05/psp/2017
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    File URL: https://wp.hse.ru/data/2017/03/09/1169504633/05PSP2017.pdf
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Public Administration; decision making; performance evaluation; peer review; England; corporate peer challenge program; event history analysis; survival analysis;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
    • D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty

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