IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/hhs/vtiwps/2008_009.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Revenues in Discrete Multi-Unit, Common Value Auctions: A Study of Three Sealed-Bid Mechanisms

Author

Listed:
  • Ahlberg, Joakim

    (VTI)

Abstract

We propose in this paper a discrete bidding model, both on quantities and in pricing. It has a two-unit demand environment where subjects bid for contracts with an unknown redemption value, common to all bidders. Prior to bidding, the bidders receive private signals of information on the (common) value. Both the value and the signals are drawn from a known discrete affiliated joint distribution. The relevant task for the paper is to compare equilibrium strategies and the seller's revenue between the three auction formats. We find that, among the three auction formats below with two players, the Vickrey auction always gives the most revenue to the seller, where the discriminatory auction becomes second and the uniform auction last. We also find that, in equilibrium, bidders bid the same amount on both items in the discriminatory auction; a phenomenon we do not notice in either of the other two auction formats. There, different amount of demand reduction is encountered.

Suggested Citation

  • Ahlberg, Joakim, 2008. "Revenues in Discrete Multi-Unit, Common Value Auctions: A Study of Three Sealed-Bid Mechanisms," Working Papers 2008:9, Swedish National Road & Transport Research Institute (VTI).
    • Handle: RePEc:hhs:vtiwps:2008_009
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
    1. Check below whether another version of this item is available online.
    2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
    3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Multi-Unit Auction; Common Value Auction; Discrete Auction; Game Theory;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hhs:vtiwps:2008_009. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Biblioteket vid VTI or Emil Svensson or Claes Eriksson or Tova Äng (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/tevtise.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.