The Defeasance of Control Rights
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- Bienz, Carsten & Faure-Grimaud, Antoine & Fluck, Zsuzsanna, 2011. "Defeasance of control rights," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 119069, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Carsten Bienz & Antoine Faure-Grimaud & Zsuzsanna Fluck, 2011. "Defeasance of Control Rights," FMG Discussion Papers dp679, Financial Markets Group.
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More about this item
Keywords
Bonds; Covenants; Defeasance; Renegotiation;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law
- G12 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Asset Pricing; Trading Volume; Bond Interest Rates
- G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-CIS-2011-02-19 (Confederation of Independent States)
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