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The green inside activist in the game of regulatory capture - an alternative to acquiring property rights?

Author

Listed:
  • Bengtsson, Ingemar

    (Division of Real Estate Science, Department of Technology and Science, Lund University)

Abstract

The phenomenon of green inside activism (GIA) is experiencing increasing interest, both in the academic world and in the public debate. GIA is a theoretical concept intended to capture the political agency of public officials who are ideologically committed to green values and work to promote them from within an agency. This article examines the economic implications of GIA from a public choice perspective. Building on e.g. Mancur Olson's theory of institutional sclerosis, Gordon Tullock's analysis of monopoly (the Tullock rectangle) and George Stigler's analysis of regulatory capture, the article addresses several issues of GIA within regulatory agencies, using the forest industry as an example. Among the issues to be addressed are the questions of: who will win and who will lose from GIA; how does GIA relate to the more familiar concepts of rent-seeking and regulatory capture; what institutional characteristics make an agency vulnerable to GIA?

Suggested Citation

  • Bengtsson, Ingemar, 2024. "The green inside activist in the game of regulatory capture - an alternative to acquiring property rights?," Working papers in Real Estate Law and Real Estate Economics 2024:4, Lund University, Division of Real Estate Science.
  • Handle: RePEc:hhs:lureal:2024_004
    Note: https://lucris.lub.lu.se/ws/portalfiles/portal/193095249/WP_2024_4.pdf
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Green inside activism; Rent seeking; Regulatory capture;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
    • K00 - Law and Economics - - General - - - General (including Data Sources and Description)
    • K23 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Regulated Industries and Administrative Law
    • K32 - Law and Economics - - Other Substantive Areas of Law - - - Energy, Environmental, Health, and Safety Law
    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
    • L73 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Primary Products and Construction - - - Forest Products

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