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Stereotypes, Sex Discrimination and Paranoia - an experimental study

Author

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  • Holm, Håkan

    (Department of Economics, Lund University)

Abstract

We analyze results from two categories of experiments where the subjects received controlled signals about the sex of their co-players. In a series of Battle of the Sexes experiments the subjects played more hawkish against women than against men. The impact of the sex signal was most pronounced among female subjects. In the second category of experiments we develop a measure of discrimination effects. We then survey discrimination effects across 32 subject groups from Israel, Sweden, UK and USA. The results indicate discrimination against females in experimental bargaining. This discrimination behavior is significant among females but not among males.

Suggested Citation

  • Holm, Håkan, 2000. "Stereotypes, Sex Discrimination and Paranoia - an experimental study," Working Papers 2000:1, Lund University, Department of Economics, revised 01 Jul 2000.
    • Handle: RePEc:hhs:lunewp:2000_001
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    Cited by:

    1. Filippin, Antonio, 2003. "Discrimination and Workers' Expectations: Experimental Evidence," IZA Discussion Papers 824, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    2. Antonio Filippin, 2003. "Discrimination and workers' expectations: experimental evidence," Departmental Working Papers 2003-16, Department of Economics, Management and Quantitative Methods at Università degli Studi di Milano.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Sex discrimination; gender differences; bargaining; experiments; coordination;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
    • J71 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor Discrimination - - - Hiring and Firing

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