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The Proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem Revisited

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Abstract

This paper provides three short and very simple proofs of the classical Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem. The theorem is first proved in the case with only two individuals in the economy. The many individual case follows then from an induction argument (over the number of individuals). The proof of the theorem is further simplified when the voting rule is assumed to be neutral.

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  • Svensson, Lars-Gunnar, 1999. "The Proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem Revisited," Working Papers 1999:1, Lund University, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:hhs:lunewp:1999_001
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    Cited by:

    1. Weber, Tjark, 2009. "Alternatives vs. Outcomes: A Note on the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem," MPRA Paper 17836, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Alexander Reffgen, 2011. "Generalizing the Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem: partial preferences, the degree of manipulation, and multi-valuedness," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 37(1), pages 39-59, June.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    voting; strategy-proofness;

    JEL classification:

    • D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General

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