Exclusive Quality - Why Exclusive Distribution may Benefit the TV-viewers
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Cited by:
- Paul Madden & Mario Pezzino, 2013. "Sports League Quality, Broadcaster TV Rights Bids and Wholesale Regulation of Sports Channels," Economics Discussion Paper Series 1304, Economics, The University of Manchester.
- Chenghuan Sean Chu, 2008. "The effect of satellite entry on product quality for cable television," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2008-12, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
- Christiaan Hogendorn & Stephen Ka Yat Yuen, 2009.
"Platform Competition With ‘Must‐Have’ Components,"
Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 57(2), pages 294-318, June.
- Christiaan Hogendorn & Ka Yat Yuen, 2004. "Platform Competition with “Must-Have” Components," Wesleyan Economics Working Papers 2004-003, Wesleyan University, Department of Economics.
- Juan José Ganuza & María Fernanda Viecens, 2010. "Exclusive Content and the Next Generation Networks," Working Papers 2010-21, FEDEA.
- Viktória Kocsis & Paul Bijl, 2007. "Network neutrality and the nature of competition between network operators," International Economics and Economic Policy, Springer, vol. 4(2), pages 159-184, August.
- Hans Jarle Kind & Tore Nilssen & Lars Sørgard, 2010.
"Price Coordination in Two-Sided Markets: Competition in the TV Industry,"
CESifo Working Paper Series
3004, CESifo.
- Jarle Kind, Hans & Nilssen, Tore & Sørgard, Lars, 2010. "Price Coordination in Two-Sided Markets: Competition in the TV Industry," Memorandum 18/2010, Oslo University, Department of Economics.
More about this item
Keywords
Exclusive Contracts; Quality; Bargaining; Avertising; Investment;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
- K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
- L42 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Vertical Restraints; Resale Price Maintenance; Quantity Discounts
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-COM-2007-01-23 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-CUL-2007-01-23 (Cultural Economics)
- NEP-EDU-2007-01-23 (Education)
- NEP-LAW-2007-01-23 (Law and Economics)
- NEP-SPO-2007-01-23 (Sports and Economics)
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