Bottled Water - A Case of Pointless Trade?
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Abstract
Suggested Citation
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Other versions of this item:
- Ganslandt, Mattias & Friberg, Richard, 2003. "Bottled Water - A Case of Pointless Trade?," CEPR Discussion Papers 4145, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
Citations
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Cited by:
- Céline Bonnet & Pierre Dubois, 2010.
"Inference on vertical contracts between manufacturers and retailers allowing for nonlinear pricing and resale price maintenance,"
RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 41(1), pages 139-164, March.
- Bonnet, Céline & Dubois, Pierre, 2008. "Inference on Vertical Contracts between Manufacturers and Retailers Allowing for Non Linear Pricing and Resale Price Maintenance," IDEI Working Papers 519, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse, revised Dec 2008.
- Bonnet, Céline & Dubois, Pierre, 2009. "Inference on Vertical Contracts between Manufacturers and Retailers Allowing for Nonlinear Pricing and Resale Price Maintenance," IDEI Working Papers 583, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
- Bonnet, Céline & Dubois, Pierre, 2009. "Inference on Vertical Contracts between Manufacturers and Retailers Allowing for Nonlinear Pricing and Resale Price Maintenance," TSE Working Papers 09-040, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
- Dubois, Pierre & Bonnet, Céline, 2008. "Inference on Vertical Contracts between Manufacturers and Retailers Allowing for Non Linear Pricing and Resale Price Maintenanc," CEPR Discussion Papers 6918, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
More about this item
Keywords
Reciprocal dumping; Intra-Industry Trade; Nested Logit Models;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- F12 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Models of Trade with Imperfect Competition and Scale Economies; Fragmentation
- F14 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Empirical Studies of Trade
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- L66 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Manufacturing - - - Food; Beverages; Cosmetics; Tobacco
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-DCM-2003-10-12 (Discrete Choice Models)
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