IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/hhs/hastef/0167.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Rationality, Transparency, and Evolutionary Selection

Author

Listed:
  • Wärneryd, Karl

    (Department of Economics)

Abstract

We discuss attempts to justify conditional cooperation in the Prisoners’ Dilemma based on the idea of identifying an opponent’s strategy. We note that the concept of such complete transparency of decision procedures is logically inconsistent. Furthermore, we observe that attempts to justify indirect transparency on evolutionary grounds, by the development of physical characteristics that signal behavior, must fail. Finally, we suggest a model of partial transparency that is logically consistent and generates conditional cooperation.

Suggested Citation

  • Wärneryd, Karl, 1997. "Rationality, Transparency, and Evolutionary Selection," SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 167, Stockholm School of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:hhs:hastef:0167
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
    1. Check below whether another version of this item is available online.
    2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
    3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Rationality; evolution; cooperation; transparency;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hhs:hastef:0167. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Helena Lundin (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/erhhsse.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.