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Same Same but Different? A Comparison of Institutional Models

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  • Hansson, Gustav

    (Department of Economics, School of Business, Economics and Law, Göteborg University)

Abstract

In the growing literature on the creation of institutions, the theories emphasizing colonial and legal origin, religious affiliation, Western European influence, and settler mortality, have been especially influential. The influence of these studies rests heavily on empirical modeling, which, since the theories are obviously closely related, might actually capture the same primary mechanism. It is therefore unclear whether the empirical relationships found are the same or if they are different. Therefore, this paper takes the empirical models seriously and discriminates amongst the existing models by using modeling selection criteria, tests of encompassing, and modeling selection.

Suggested Citation

  • Hansson, Gustav, 2008. "Same Same but Different? A Comparison of Institutional Models," Working Papers in Economics 329, University of Gothenburg, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:hhs:gunwpe:0329
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/2077/18719
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Gustav Hansson, 2009. "What Determines Rule of Law? An Empirical Investigation of Rival Models," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 62(3), pages 371-393, August.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    institutions; colonial origin; non-nested tests; modeling selection;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • F54 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - Colonialism; Imperialism; Postcolonialism
    • N40 - Economic History - - Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation - - - General, International, or Comparative

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