IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/hhb/sicgwp/2010_007.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Delegated Portfolio Management with Socially Responsible Investment Constraints

Author

Listed:
  • Fabretti, Annalisa

    (University of Rome “Tor Vergata")

  • Herzel, Stefano

    (University of Rome “Tor Vergata")

Abstract

We consider the problem of how to set a compensation for a portfolio manager who is required to restrict the investment set, as it happens when applying socially responsible screening. This is a problem of Delegated Portfolio Management where the reduction of the investment opportunities to the subset of sustainable assets involves a loss in the expected earnings for the portfolio manager, compensated by the investor through an extra bonus on the realized return. Under simple assumptions on the investor, the manager and the market, we compute the optimal bonus as a function of the manager's risk aversion and his expertise, and of the impact of the portfolio restriction on the Mean Variance efficient frontier. We conclude by discussing the problem of selecting the best managers when his ability is not directly observable by the investor.

Suggested Citation

  • Fabretti, Annalisa & Herzel, Stefano, 2010. "Delegated Portfolio Management with Socially Responsible Investment Constraints," Sustainable Investment and Corporate Governance Working Papers 2010/7, Sustainable Investment Research Platform.
    • Handle: RePEc:hhb:sicgwp:2010_007
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://sites.google.com/site/climatedeclaration/Home/sirpwp10-07-FabrettiHerzel.pdf?attredirects=0&d=1
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Gaurav Talan & Gagan Deep Sharma, 2019. "Doing Well by Doing Good: A Systematic Review and Research Agenda for Sustainable Investment," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 11(2), pages 1-16, January.
    2. Brisker, Eric & Wang, Jinjing & Wang, Shuai, 2024. "Why do life insurers hold sin bonds? Evidence from investment delegation," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 60(C).
    3. Sheng, Jiliang & Wang, Xiaoting & Yang, Jun, 2012. "Incentive contracts in delegated portfolio management under VaR constraint," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 29(5), pages 1679-1685.
    4. Annalisa Fabretti & Stefano Herzel & Mustafa C. Pinar, 2014. "Delegated Portfolio Management under Ambiguity Aversion," CEIS Research Paper 304, Tor Vergata University, CEIS, revised 06 Feb 2014.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Delegated portfolio management; Socially responsible investment; Incentives; Extrinsic incentives; Intrinsic motives;
    All these keywords.

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hhb:sicgwp:2010_007. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Pontus Cerin (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/iikthse.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.