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Preparing a (quantum) belief system

Author

Listed:
  • Vladimir Ivanovitch Danilov

    (CEMI - Central Economic Mathematical Institute - RAS - Russian Academy of Sciences [Moscow])

  • Ariane Lambert-Mogiliansky

    (PSE - Paris School of Economics - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École des Ponts ParisTech - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement, PJSE - Paris Jourdan Sciences Economiques - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École des Ponts ParisTech - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

In this paper we investigate the potential for persuasion linked to the quantum indeterminacy of beliefs. We first formulate the persuasion problem in the context of quantum-like beliefs. We provide an economic example of belief manipulation that illustrates the setting. We next establish a theoretical result showing that in the absence of constraints on measurements, any state can be obtained as the result of a suitable sequence of measurements. We finally discuss the practical significance of our result in the context of persuasion.

Suggested Citation

  • Vladimir Ivanovitch Danilov & Ariane Lambert-Mogiliansky, 2017. "Preparing a (quantum) belief system," Working Papers halshs-01542068, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-01542068
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-01542068
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Emir Kamenica & Matthew Gentzkow, 2011. "Bayesian Persuasion," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 101(6), pages 2590-2615, October.
    2. V. Danilov & A. Lambert-Mogiliansky, 2010. "Expected utility theory under non-classical uncertainty," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 68(1), pages 25-47, February.
    3. V. I. Danilov & A. Lambert-Mogiliansky & V. Vergopoulos, 2018. "Dynamic consistency of expected utility under non-classical (quantum) uncertainty," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 84(4), pages 645-670, June.
    4. George A. Akerlof & Robert J. Shiller, 2015. "Phishing for Phools: The Economics of Manipulation and Deception," Economics Books, Princeton University Press, edition 1, number 10534.
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    Cited by:

    1. Danilov, V.I. & Lambert-Mogiliansky, A., 2018. "Targeting in quantum persuasion problem," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 78(C), pages 142-149.
    2. Zheng, Xiaojing & Lu, Jinfei & Chen, Yanbin & Cong, Xinrong & Sun, Cuiping, 2021. "Random belief system dynamics in complex networks under time-varying logic constraints," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 566(C).

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    Keywords

    Quantum-like; Persuasion; Measurement;
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