Why are Reforms incomplete? Reputation versus the " need for enemies "
[Pourquoi les réformes sont-elles incomplètes ? Réputation versus « besoin d'ennemis »]
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Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-01251375
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- Maxime Menuet & Patrick Villieu, 2015. "Why Are Reforms Incomplete? Reputation Versus The " Need For Enemies "," Working Papers halshs-01199773, HAL.
- Maxime MENUET & Patrick VILLIEU, 2015. "Why are Reforms incomplete? Reputation versus the "need for enemies"," LEO Working Papers / DR LEO 2090, Orleans Economics Laboratory / Laboratoire d'Economie d'Orleans (LEO), University of Orleans.
References listed on IDEAS
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Keywords
Public Debt; Public Choice; Non-cooperative games; Reputation;All these keywords.
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