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Optimal Preventive Bank Supervision: Combining Random Audits and Continuous Intervention

Author

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  • Mohamed Belhaj

    (GREQAM - Groupement de Recherche en Économie Quantitative d'Aix-Marseille - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - AMU - Aix Marseille Université - ECM - École Centrale de Marseille - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Nataliya Klimenko

    (GREQAM - Groupement de Recherche en Économie Quantitative d'Aix-Marseille - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - AMU - Aix Marseille Université - ECM - École Centrale de Marseille - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

Early regulator interventions into problem banks is one of the key suggestions of Basel II. However, no guidance is given on their design. To fill this gap, we outline an incentive-based preventive supervision strategy that eliminates bad asset management in banks. Two supervision techniques are combined: continuous regulator intervention and random audits. Random audit technologies differ as to quality and cost. Our design ensures good management without excessive supervision costs, through a gradual adjustment of supervision effort to the bank's financial health. We also consider preventive supervision in a setting where audits can be delegated to an independent audit agency, showing how to induce agency compliance with regulatory instructions in the least costly way.

Suggested Citation

  • Mohamed Belhaj & Nataliya Klimenko, 2012. "Optimal Preventive Bank Supervision: Combining Random Audits and Continuous Intervention," Working Papers halshs-00790464, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-00790464
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00790464v1
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Heller, Yuval & Peleg Lazar, Sharon & Raviv, Alon, 2022. "Banks’ risk taking and creditors’ bargaining power," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 74(C).
    2. Masciandaro, Donato & Peia, Oana & Romelli, Davide, 2020. "Banking supervision and external auditors: Theory and empirics," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 46(C).
    3. Donato Masciandaro & Davide Romelli, 2017. "Banking Supervision and External Autditors: What works best?," BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers 1746, BAFFI CAREFIN, Centre for Applied Research on International Markets Banking Finance and Regulation, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    moral hazard; delegation; banking supervision; random audit; incentives;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation

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