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Why So Many Representatives? Extending the Cube Root Law to Local Assemblies

Author

Listed:
  • Benoît Le Maux

    (CREM - Centre de recherche en économie et management - UNICAEN - Université de Caen Normandie - NU - Normandie Université - UR - Université de Rennes - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Sonia Paty

    (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon - Saint-Etienne - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - UJM - Université Jean Monnet - Saint-Étienne - EM - EMLyon Business School - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

We investigate the impact of territorial fragmentation on political representation by applying Taagepera's cube root law to subnational governments. Our model reveals that the total number of local representatives is more elastic to changes in the number of jurisdictions (elasticity e = 2/3) than to variations in population size (e = 1/3), a relationship we refer to as the law of 2/3. As a result, political representation is amplified in fragmented areas. Empirical evidence from diverse datasets supports this new law.

Suggested Citation

  • Benoît Le Maux & Sonia Paty, 2024. "Why So Many Representatives? Extending the Cube Root Law to Local Assemblies," Working Papers hal-04736092, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-04736092
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-04736092v1
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    Keywords

    Representative Democracy; Decentralization; Local public sector; Cube Root Law;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
    • H7 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations
    • H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government

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