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Selective Information Sharing and Group Delusion

Author

Listed:
  • Anton Suvorov

    (New Economic School)

  • Jeroen van de Ven

    (UvA - University of Amsterdam [Amsterdam] = Universiteit van Amsterdam)

  • Marie Claire Villeval

    (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon - Saint-Etienne - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - UJM - Université Jean Monnet - Saint-Étienne - EM - EMLyon Business School - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, IZA - Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit - Institute of Labor Economics)

Abstract

Although they usually manage to combine information to make well-informed decisions, groups also make mistakes. We investigate experimentally one source of sub-optimal decision-making by groups: the selective and asymmetric sharing of ego-relevant information within teams. We show that good news about one's performance is shared more often with team members than bad news. Asymmetric information sharing combined with the receivers' selection neglect boosts team confidence compared to an unbiased exchange of feedback. Consequently, weaker teams make worse investment decisions in bets whose success depends on the team's ability. The endogenous social exchange of ego-relevant information may foster detrimental group delusion.

Suggested Citation

  • Anton Suvorov & Jeroen van de Ven & Marie Claire Villeval, 2024. "Selective Information Sharing and Group Delusion," Working Papers hal-04706330, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-04706330
    DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.4827884
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-04706330v1
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