Flip-flopping and Endogenous Turnout

I consider an electoral competition model where each candidate is associated with an exogenous initial position from which she can deviate to maximize her vote share, a strategy known as flip-flopping. Citizens have an intrinsic preference for consistent candidates, and abstain due to alienation, i.e. when their utility from their preferred candidate falls below a common exogenous threshold (termed the alienation threshold). I show how the alienation threshold shapes candidates' flip-flopping strategy. When the alienation threshold is high, i.e. when citizens are reluctant to vote, there is no flip-flopping at equilibrium. When the alienation threshold is low, candidates flip-flop toward the center of the policy space. Surprisingly, I find a positive correlation between flip-flopping and voter turnout at equilibrium, despite voters' preference for consistent candidates. Finally, I explore alternative models in which candidates' objective function differs from vote share. I show that electoral competition can lead to polarization when candidates maximize their number of votes.