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Explaining the Ammunition Shortage: The Show vs. Have Military Power Game

Author

Listed:
  • Damien Besancenot

    (LIRAES (URP_ 4470) - Laboratoire Interdisciplinaire de Recherche Appliquée en Economie de la Santé - UPCité - Université Paris Cité, UPCité - Université Paris Cité)

  • Radu Vranceanu

    (ESSEC Business School and THEMA (UMR 8184) - ESSEC Business School - THEMA - Théorie économique, modélisation et applications - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - CY - CY Cergy Paris Université)

Abstract

The return of high-intensity conflict at Europe's borders has exposed the massive underinvestment in ammunition by many Western states, relative to the normal availability of main weapons. This paper complements existing explanations for this relative imbalance with insights from a signaling game. In an environment of uncertain information, where neither military budgets nor investment in ammunition can be observed, low-budget states may imitate the procurement strategies of high-budget states to project an image of power. In this context, high-budget states have an incentive to over-invest in main weapons and neglect ammunition as a strategy to dissuade imitation by low-budget states. While this behavior may be rational in times of peace when perceptions may matter as much as capabilities, during wartime, the deficit in ammunition is extremely harmful, as it increases the likelihood of the opponent's victory.

Suggested Citation

  • Damien Besancenot & Radu Vranceanu, 2024. "Explaining the Ammunition Shortage: The Show vs. Have Military Power Game," Working Papers hal-04678822, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-04678822
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://essec.hal.science/hal-04678822v1
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    High-intensity warfare; Signaling game; Military power; Perceived power. JEL Classification -D82 F52 H56 H57; Perceived power. JEL Classification -D82;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • F52 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - National Security; Economic Nationalism
    • H56 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - National Security and War
    • H57 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Procurement

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