Transiger sur l'artificialisation

Like France and its "Zero Net Land Take" (ZAN) goal, several European jurisdictions are adopting political targets to reduce soil or land degradation. Implementing these objectives raises ethical, economic, and political issues. So how can we foster more stakeholders to limit soil degradation? This research explores the revelance of transferable permit (PT) and their suitability with the ZAN framework. Given their rationing logic, these economic instruments align with the goals of reducing artificialisation and can be implemented through three complementary forms: transferable development rights, compensation units, and transferable planning permits. Yet, their application to non-uniform forms of pollution, such as soil degradation, involves trade-offs between economic efficiency and environmental integrity. Our study shows that the ZAN framework is analogous to a partially transferable planning permits system between municipalities and stresses that it functions as a land degradation neutrality device, neglecting soil diverse qualities. To better protect soil ecological functions, we suggest revising the definition of these "permits". Finally, we discuss the merits of introducing financial transferability of these "permits" to make the ZAN framework an instrument capable of addressing economic incentives favouring soil degradation.