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Efficiency in School Choice: Structures and Implementation Conditions for Nash Equilibria

Author

Listed:
  • Cyril Rouault

    (CEPS - Centre d'Economie de l'ENS Paris-Saclay - Université Paris-Saclay - ENS Paris Saclay - Ecole Normale Supérieure Paris-Saclay)

Abstract

This paper examines a preference revelation game that utilizes the student-proposing deferred acceptance mechanism (DA) in the context of school choice. Our focus is on assignments that Pareto-dominate the student-optimal stable assignment, specifically investigating the structures of Nash equilibria that implement these assignments with DA (i.e., Nash equilibria that lead to these outcomes with DA). While some assignments cannot be implemented with DA, we identify a strategy profile that determines whether a given assignment is implementable when each school has a capacity of one. However, this profile cannot determine implementability when at least one school has more than one available seat. As a result, we focus on specific assignments that Pareto-dominate the student-optimal stable assignment and establish sufficient conditions on strategy profiles that can implement these assignments with DA.

Suggested Citation

  • Cyril Rouault, 2023. "Efficiency in School Choice: Structures and Implementation Conditions for Nash Equilibria," Working Papers hal-04238849, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-04238849
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-04238849v3
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    File URL: https://hal.science/hal-04238849v3/document
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