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Pollution Permits in Oligopolies: The role of abatement technologies

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Listed:
  • Clémence Christin

    (CREM - Centre de recherche en économie et management - UNICAEN - Université de Caen Normandie - NU - Normandie Université - UR - Université de Rennes - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Jean-Philippe Nicolaï

    (EconomiX - EconomiX - UPN - Université Paris Nanterre - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Jérôme Pouyet

    (THEMA - Théorie économique, modélisation et applications - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - CY - CY Cergy Paris Université, ESSEC Business School)

Abstract

This paper examines, under imperfect competition, the effect of a cap-and-trade system on industry profits and the interaction between cap-and-trade system and the evolution of the market structure, both depending on the type of abatement technologies used by firms. Two extreme types are considered: end-of-pipe abatement technology-meaning, filtration and other mechanisms that are largely independent of production decisionsand process-integrated technology, which entails integrating cleaner or more energy-efficient methods into production. This paper prescribes that the distribution of free allocation should depend on the kind of abatement technologies. Finally, a reserve of pollution permits for new entrants is justified when the industry uses a process-integrated abatement technology, while a system with a preemption right may be justified in the case of end-of-pipe abatement technology.

Suggested Citation

  • Clémence Christin & Jean-Philippe Nicolaï & Jérôme Pouyet, 2021. "Pollution Permits in Oligopolies: The role of abatement technologies," Working Papers hal-03328947, HAL.
  • Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-03328947
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-03328947
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    Keywords

    cap-and-trade system; imperfect competition; end-of-pipe abatement; process-integrated abatement; reserve for entrants;
    All these keywords.

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