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Allocation des rendez-vous en ligne : un mécanisme pour décourager le trafic

Author

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  • Jeanne Hagenbach

    (ECON - Département d'économie (Sciences Po) - Sciences Po - Sciences Po - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Dorothea Kübler

    (Der Technischen Universität Berlin, WZB - Berlin Social Science Center - Berlin Social Science Center)

Abstract

De nombreux rendez-vous administratifs sont aujourd'hui alloués en ligne sur des plateformes de réservation. Le système d'allocation fonctionne souvent selon le modèle du "1er arrivé, 1er servi", c'est-à-dire que les demandeurs se connectent à la plateforme et réservent les créneaux encore disponibles au moment de leur connexion. Dans plusieurs administrations et pays, il est apparu récemment que ce système est vulnérable au trafic de créneaux. Des trafiquants utilisent des bots pour réserver les créneaux plus rapidement que les demandeurs. Leur rapidité leur permet non seulement de capter tous les créneaux au moment de leur mise en ligne mais également d'y associer plus tard les identités de leurs clients, s'adaptant donc à la contrainte créée par les contrôles d'identités. Par leurs pratiques, les trafiquants brisent l'égalité d'accès au service public censée prévaloir. Sur la base du travail de Hakimov et al. (2021), nous présentons dans cette note un système alternatif d'allocation des créneaux qui décourage les trafiquants. Ce système simple fonctionne "par lots" : un lot de créneaux est mis en ligne. Les demandes pour ce lot sont collectées pendant une période donnée. A la fin de cette période, les créneaux sont alloués aléatoirement aux demandes collectées. Si un rendez-vous obtenu est annulé, il n'est pas remis en ligne directement mais alloué avec un des lots suivants. Dans ce système, les trafiquants ont les mêmes chances que les demandeurs d'obtenir un créneau, et ces derniers ne se tournent donc plus vers les trafiquants. Nous discutons brièvement des avantages que pourrait avoir un tel système en matière d'allocation des rendez-vous en préfecture pour les personnes étrangères.

Suggested Citation

  • Jeanne Hagenbach & Dorothea Kübler, 2021. "Allocation des rendez-vous en ligne : un mécanisme pour décourager le trafic," SciencePo Working papers Main halshs-03247287, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:spmain:halshs-03247287
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-03247287
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Eric Budish & Peter Cramton & John Shim, 2015. "Editor's Choice The High-Frequency Trading Arms Race: Frequent Batch Auctions as a Market Design Response," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 130(4), pages 1547-1621.
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