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Redistribution, inégalité et chômage

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  • Vincent Touzé

    (OFCE - Observatoire français des conjonctures économiques (Sciences Po) - Sciences Po - Sciences Po)

Abstract

This paper proposes a theoretical foundation for the empirically observed inequahty-unemployment relation. This is achieved with an overlapping generations economy in which the government applies linear taxation to redistribute wealth amongst individuals. The individuals' characteristics are not observable and the parameters of the redistribution system are chosen using the Mirrlees optimal taxation model. This kind of redistribution system creates a relation between inequaUty and unemployment. The optimal redistribution system is seen as a specific choice between inequality and unemployment. Static purchasing power can also be affected in the long run. These findings are illustrated by a numerical example.

Suggested Citation

  • Vincent Touzé, 1999. "Redistribution, inégalité et chômage," SciencePo Working papers Main hal-03604469, HAL.
  • Handle: RePEc:hal:spmain:hal-03604469
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal-sciencespo.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-03604469
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Stiglitz, Joseph E., 1987. "Pareto efficient and optimal taxation and the new new welfare economics," Handbook of Public Economics, in: A. J. Auerbach & M. Feldstein (ed.), Handbook of Public Economics, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 15, pages 991-1042, Elsevier.
    2. Lucas, Robert E, Jr, 1990. "Why Doesn't Capital Flow from Rich to Poor Countries?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(2), pages 92-96, May.
    3. Thomas Piketty, 1997. "La redistribution fiscale face au chômage," Revue Française d'Économie, Programme National Persée, vol. 12(1), pages 157-201.
    4. Jullien, Bruno & Picard, Pierre, 1998. "A Classical Model of Involuntary Unemployment: Efficiency Wages and Macroeconomic Policy," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 78(2), pages 263-285, February.
    5. J. A. Mirrlees, 1971. "An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 38(2), pages 175-208.
    6. Sen, Amartya, 1973. "On Economic Inequality," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780198281931.
    7. Thomas Piketty, 1997. "Immigration et justice sociale," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 48(5), pages 1291-1309.
    8. Shapiro, Carl & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1984. "Equilibrium Unemployment as a Worker Discipline Device," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 74(3), pages 433-444, June.
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • E24 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Consumption, Saving, Production, Employment, and Investment - - - Employment; Unemployment; Wages; Intergenerational Income Distribution; Aggregate Human Capital; Aggregate Labor Productivity
    • D31 - Microeconomics - - Distribution - - - Personal Income and Wealth Distribution

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