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Les banques centrales peuvent-elles encore être indépendantes ?

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  • Christophe Blot

    (OFCE - Observatoire français des conjonctures économiques (Sciences Po) - Sciences Po - Sciences Po)

Abstract

This paper deals with the independence of central banks. It provides a critical analysis of the foundations of the model that emerged in the 1990s and analyses its recent development. Central banks are now heavily involved in financial stability issues and the implementation of unconventional measures have magnified interactions with fiscal policy. We therefore suggest that the independence of central banks is not a sufficient condition for the effectiveness of economic policies. The broadening of their mandate and the interactions with fiscal policy and financial regulation call instead to strengthen the democratic control of central banks and the coordination between monetary policy, fiscal policy and prudential policy. To this end, we propose to change the composition of the committees in charge of the implementation of monetary and financial regulation policies in order to internalize externalities and coordinate decisions.

Suggested Citation

  • Christophe Blot, 2019. "Les banques centrales peuvent-elles encore être indépendantes ?," SciencePo Working papers Main hal-03403636, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:spmain:hal-03403636
    DOI: 10.3917/rfe.183.0127
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://sciencespo.hal.science/hal-03403636
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    Keywords

    Banque centrale; Stabilité financière; Politique budgétaire; Politique monétaire;
    All these keywords.

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