IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/hal/pseptp/halshs-01204762.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Endogenous Debt Crises

Author

Listed:
  • Daniel Cohen

    (PSE - Paris-Jourdan Sciences Economiques - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École des Ponts ParisTech - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, PSE - Paris School of Economics - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École des Ponts ParisTech - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement)

  • Sébastien Villemot

    (PSE - Paris-Jourdan Sciences Economiques - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École des Ponts ParisTech - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, PSE - Paris School of Economics - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École des Ponts ParisTech - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement)

Abstract

We distinguish two types of debt crises: those that are the outcome of exogenous shocks (to productivity growth for instance) and those that are endogenously created, either by self-fulfilling panic in financial markets or by the reckless behavior of "Panglossian" borrowers. After Krugman, we characterize as "Panglossian" those borrowers who only focus on their best growth prospects, anticipating to default on their debt if hit by an adverse shock, rationally ignoring the risk of default. We apply these categories empirically to the data. We show that, taken together, endogenous crises are powerful explanations of debt crises, more important for instance than the sheer effect of growth on a country's solvency.

Suggested Citation

  • Daniel Cohen & Sébastien Villemot, 2015. "Endogenous Debt Crises," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) halshs-01204762, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:pseptp:halshs-01204762
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jimonfin.2014.11.005
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-01204762
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-01204762/document
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.jimonfin.2014.11.005?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Campos, Camila F.S. & Jaimovich, Dany & Panizza, Ugo, 2006. "The unexplained part of public debt," Emerging Markets Review, Elsevier, vol. 7(3), pages 228-243, September.
    2. Gelos, R. Gaston & Sahay, Ratna & Sandleris, Guido, 2011. "Sovereign borrowing by developing countries: What determines market access?," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 83(2), pages 243-254, March.
    3. Cohen, Daniel & Valadier, Cécile, 2011. "40 years of sovereign debt crises," CEPR Discussion Papers 8269, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    4. Enrique Moral-Benito, 2012. "Determinants of Economic Growth: A Bayesian Panel Data Approach," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 94(2), pages 566-579, May.
    5. Chamon, Marcos, 2007. "Can debt crises be self-fulfilling?," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 82(1), pages 234-244, January.
    6. Cole, Harold L. & Kehoe, Timothy J., 1996. "A self-fulfilling model of Mexico's 1994-1995 debt crisis," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(3-4), pages 309-330, November.
    7. Cristina Arellano, 2008. "Default Risk and Income Fluctuations in Emerging Economies," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 98(3), pages 690-712, June.
    8. Alberto Alesina & Guido Tabellini, 1990. "A Positive Theory of Fiscal Deficits and Government Debt," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 57(3), pages 403-414.
    9. Aart Kraay & Vikram Nehru, 2006. "When Is External Debt Sustainable?," The World Bank Economic Review, World Bank, vol. 20(3), pages 341-365.
    10. Menahem E. Yaari, 1965. "Uncertain Lifetime, Life Insurance, and the Theory of the Consumer," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 32(2), pages 137-150.
    11. Jonathan Eaton & Mark Gersovitz, 1981. "Debt with Potential Repudiation: Theoretical and Empirical Analysis," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 48(2), pages 289-309.
    12. Murphy, Kevin M & Topel, Robert H, 2002. "Estimation and Inference in Two-Step Econometric Models," Journal of Business & Economic Statistics, American Statistical Association, vol. 20(1), pages 88-97, January.
    13. Aguiar, Mark & Gopinath, Gita, 2006. "Defaultable debt, interest rates and the current account," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 69(1), pages 64-83, June.
    14. Calvo, Guillermo A, 1988. "Servicing the Public Debt: The Role of Expectations," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(4), pages 647-661, September.
    15. Jeremy I. Bulow & Kenneth Rogoff, 1988. "Sovereign Debt Restructurings: Panacea or Pangloss?," NBER Working Papers 2637, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    16. Harold L. Cole & Timothy J. Kehoe, 2000. "Self-Fulfilling Debt Crises," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 67(1), pages 91-116.
    17. Campos, Camila F.S. & Jaimovich, Dany & Panizza, Ugo, 2006. "The unexplained part of public debt," Emerging Markets Review, Elsevier, vol. 7(3), pages 228-243, September.
    18. World Bank, 2006. "World Development Indicators 2006," World Bank Publications - Books, The World Bank Group, number 8151.
    19. Cohen, Daniel & Portes, Richard, 2004. "Towards a Lender of First Resort," CEPR Discussion Papers 4615, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    20. Blanchard, Olivier J, 1985. "Debt, Deficits, and Finite Horizons," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 93(2), pages 223-247, April.
    21. Beetsma, Roel & Mavromatis, Kostas, 2014. "An analysis of eurobonds," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 45(C), pages 91-111.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Cohen, Daniel & Villemot, Sébastien, 2012. "The Sovereign Default Puzzle: Modelling Issues and Lessons for Europe," CEPR Discussion Papers 8971, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    2. Serhan Cevik & João Tovar Jalles, 2022. "An Apocalypse Foretold: Climate Shocks and Sovereign Defaults," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 33(1), pages 89-108, February.
    3. Giancarlo Corsetti & Luca Dedola, 2016. "The Mystery of the Printing Press: Monetary Policy and Self-Fulfilling Debt Crises," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 14(6), pages 1329-1371.
    4. Wei-han Liu, 2023. "Attaining stochastic optimal control over debt ratios in U.S. markets," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 61(3), pages 967-993, October.
    5. Petr Jakubík & Tomáš Slacík, 2013. "Measuring Financial (In)Stability in Emerging Europe: A New Index-Based Approach," Financial Stability Report, Oesterreichische Nationalbank (Austrian Central Bank), issue 25, pages 102-117.
    6. Philippe Bacchetta & Elena Perazzi & Eric van Wincoop, 2015. "Self-Fulfilling Debt Crises: Can Monetary Policy Really Help?," Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'économie 15.06, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, Département d’économie.
    7. Bacchetta, Philippe & Perazzi, Elena & van Wincoop, Eric, 2018. "Self-fulfilling debt crises: What can monetary policy do?," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 110(C), pages 119-134.
    8. Jean-Marc Fournier & Manuel Bétin, 2018. "Sovereign defaults: Evidence on the importance of government effectiveness," OECD Economics Department Working Papers 1494, OECD Publishing.
    9. Carré, Sylvain & Cohen, Daniel & Villemot, Sébastien, 2019. "The sources of sovereign risk: a calibration based on Lévy stochastic processes," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 118(C), pages 31-43.
    10. Karl Whelan, 2022. "The past, present and future of euro area monetary-fiscal interactions," International Economics and Economic Policy, Springer, vol. 19(3), pages 557-579, July.
    11. Villemot, Sébastien, 2012. "Accelerating the resolution of sovereign debt models using an endogenous grid method," Dynare Working Papers 17, CEPREMAP.
    12. Mitchener, Kris & Trebesch, Christoph, 2021. "Sovereign Debt in the 21st Century: Looking Backward, Looking Forward," CEPR Discussion Papers 15935, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Aguiar, M. & Chatterjee, S. & Cole, H. & Stangebye, Z., 2016. "Quantitative Models of Sovereign Debt Crises," Handbook of Macroeconomics, in: J. B. Taylor & Harald Uhlig (ed.), Handbook of Macroeconomics, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 0, pages 1697-1755, Elsevier.
    2. Niepelt, Dirk, 2014. "Debt maturity without commitment," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 68(S), pages 37-54.
    3. Javier Bianchi & Jorge Mondragon, 2022. "Monetary Independence and Rollover Crises," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 137(1), pages 435-491.
    4. Florian Kirsch & Ronald Rühmkorf, 2017. "Sovereign borrowing, financial assistance, and debt repudiation," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 64(4), pages 777-804, December.
    5. Ugo Panizza & Federico Sturzenegger & Jeromin Zettelmeyer, 2009. "The Economics and Law of Sovereign Debt and Default," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 47(3), pages 651-698, September.
    6. Cohen, Daniel & Villemot, Sébastien, 2012. "The Sovereign Default Puzzle: Modelling Issues and Lessons for Europe," CEPR Discussion Papers 8971, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    7. Jean-Marc Fournier & Manuel Bétin, 2018. "Sovereign defaults: Evidence on the importance of government effectiveness," OECD Economics Department Working Papers 1494, OECD Publishing.
    8. Mark Aguiar & Satyajit Chatterjee & Harold Cole & Zachary Stangebye, 2022. "Self-Fulfilling Debt Crises, Revisited," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 130(5), pages 1147-1183.
    9. Mark Aguiar & Manuel Amador, 2020. "Self-Fulfilling Debt Dilution: Maturity and Multiplicity in Debt Models," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 110(9), pages 2783-2818, September.
    10. Stangebye, Zachary R., 2020. "Beliefs and long-maturity sovereign debt," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 127(C).
    11. Roch, Francisco & Uhlig, Harald, 2018. "The dynamics of sovereign debt crises and bailouts," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 114(C), pages 1-13.
    12. Stefan Niemann & Paul Pichler, 2020. "Optimal fiscal policy and sovereign debt crises," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 37, pages 234-254, July.
    13. Christoph Trebesch & Mr. Michael G. Papaioannou & Mr. Udaibir S Das, 2012. "Sovereign Debt Restructurings 1950-2010: Literature Survey, Data, and Stylized Facts," IMF Working Papers 2012/203, International Monetary Fund.
    14. Stefan Niemann & Paul Pichler, 2020. "Optimal fiscal policy and sovereign debt crises," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 37, pages 234-254, July.
    15. Dirk Niepelt, 2009. "Sovereign Debt Maturity without Commitment," 2009 Meeting Papers 231, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    16. Diego J. Perez, 2015. "Sovereign Debt, Domestic Banks and the Provision of Public Liquidity," Discussion Papers 15-016, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research.
    17. Carré, Sylvain & Cohen, Daniel & Villemot, Sébastien, 2019. "The sources of sovereign risk: a calibration based on Lévy stochastic processes," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 118(C), pages 31-43.
    18. Mark Aguiar & Manuel Amador & Stelios Fourakis, 2020. "On the Welfare Losses from External Sovereign Borrowing," IMF Economic Review, Palgrave Macmillan;International Monetary Fund, vol. 68(1), pages 163-194, March.
    19. Juan Carlos Conesa & Timothy J. Kehoe, 2017. "Gambling for redemption and self-fulfilling debt crises," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 64(4), pages 707-740, December.
    20. Guido Lorenzoni & Iván Werning, 2019. "Slow Moving Debt Crises," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 109(9), pages 3229-3263, September.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Sovereign debt; Self-fulfilling crises;

    JEL classification:

    • F34 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Lending and Debt Problems

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hal:pseptp:halshs-01204762. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Caroline Bauer (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.