IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/hal/journl/halshs-04005045.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Choice under social influence: effects of learning behaviors on the collective dynamics

Author

Listed:
  • Viktoriya Semeshenko

    (Departamento de Economía [Buenos Aires] - Facultad de Ciencias Económicas [Buenos Aires] - UBA - Universidad de Buenos Aires [Buenos Aires], TIMC-IMAG - Techniques de l'Ingénierie Médicale et de la Complexité - Informatique, Mathématiques et Applications, Grenoble - UMR 5525 - UJF - Université Joseph Fourier - Grenoble 1 - Grenoble INP - Institut polytechnique de Grenoble - Grenoble Institute of Technology - VAS - VetAgro Sup - Institut national d'enseignement supérieur et de recherche en alimentation, santé animale, sciences agronomiques et de l'environnement - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Mirta B. Gordon

    (AMA - Analyse de données, Modélisation et Apprentissage automatique [Grenoble] - LIG - Laboratoire d'Informatique de Grenoble - UPMF - Université Pierre Mendès France - Grenoble 2 - UJF - Université Joseph Fourier - Grenoble 1 - Grenoble INP - Institut polytechnique de Grenoble - Grenoble Institute of Technology - INPG - Institut National Polytechnique de Grenoble - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Jean-Pierre Nadal

    (CAMS - Centre d'Analyse et de Mathématique sociales - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, LPS - Laboratoire de Physique Statistique de l'ENS - FRDPENS - Fédération de recherche du Département de physique de l'Ecole Normale Supérieure - ENS Paris - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - UPMC - Université Pierre et Marie Curie - Paris 6 - UPD7 - Université Paris Diderot - Paris 7 - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Denis Phan

    (GEMAS - Groupe d'étude des méthodes de l'analyse sociologique - UP4 - Université Paris-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

We consider a simple model in which a population of individuals with idiosyncratic willingnessesto pay must choose repeatedly either to buy or not a unit of a single homogeneous good at a givenprice. Utilities of buyers have positive externalities due to social interactions among customers.If the latter are strong enough, the system has multiple Nash equilibria, revealing coordinationproblems. We assume that individuals learn to make their decisions repeatedly. We study theperformances along the learning path as well as at the customers' reached equilibria, for differentlearning schemes based on past earned and/or forgone payoffs. Results are presented as a functionof the price, for weak and strong social interactions. Pure reinforcement learning is shown tohinder convergence to the Nash equilibrium, even when it is unique. For strong social interactions,coordination on the optimal equilibrium through learning is reached only with some of the learningschemes, under restrictive conditions. The issues of the learning rules are shown to depend cruciallyon the values of their parameters, and are sensitive to the agents' initial beliefs.

Suggested Citation

  • Viktoriya Semeshenko & Mirta B. Gordon & Jean-Pierre Nadal & Denis Phan, 2007. "Choice under social influence: effects of learning behaviors on the collective dynamics," Post-Print halshs-04005045, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-04005045
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
    1. Check below whether another version of this item is available online.
    2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
    3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

    Other versions of this item:

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Denis Phan, 2006. "Discrete Choices under Social Influence:Generic Properties," Post-Print halshs-00105857, HAL.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-04005045. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: CCSD (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.