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Risk Sharing in Village Economies Revisited

Author

Listed:
  • Tessa Bold

    (Stockholm University)

  • Tobias Broer

    (PSE - Paris School of Economics - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École des Ponts ParisTech - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement, PJSE - Paris Jourdan Sciences Economiques - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École des Ponts ParisTech - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement, Stockholm University)

Abstract

We quantitatively evaluate a model of insurance with limited commitment where the requirement that contracts be immune to deviations by subcoalitions makes group size endogenous, as proposed by Genicot and Ray. We compare the model's predictions to panel data from rural Indian villages. Apart from predicting a realistic degree of insurance, the model captures the evidence along two new dimensions: First, the largest coalition-proof groups are substantially smaller than typical villages. Second, with strong insurance in small groups, individual consumption responds symmetrically to income rises and falls, while alternative models predict strong counterfactual asymmetry.

Suggested Citation

  • Tessa Bold & Tobias Broer, 2021. "Risk Sharing in Village Economies Revisited," Post-Print halshs-03758973, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-03758973
    DOI: 10.1093/jeea/jvab043
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    Cited by:

    1. Mazur, Karol, 2023. "Sharing risk to avoid tragedy: Informal insurance and irrigation in village economies," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 161(C).
    2. Berlinger, Edina & Gosztonyi, Márton & Havran, Dániel & Pollák, Zoltán, 2023. "Interpersonal versus interbank lending networks: The role of intermediation in risk-sharing," Emerging Markets Review, Elsevier, vol. 54(C).
    3. Juan Daniel Hernandez & Fernando Jaramillo & Hubert Kempf & Fabien Moizeau & Thomas Vendryes, 2023. "Limited Commitment, Social Control and Risk-Sharing Coalitions in Village Economies," Documents de recherche 23-03, Centre d'Études des Politiques Économiques (EPEE), Université d'Evry Val d'Essonne.
    4. Christian Cox & Akanksha Negi & Digvijay Negi, 2022. "Risk-Sharing Tests with Network Transaction Costs," Monash Econometrics and Business Statistics Working Papers 5/22, Monash University, Department of Econometrics and Business Statistics.
    5. Pietrobon, Davide, 2024. "The dual role of insurance in input use: Mitigating risk versus curtailing incentives," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 166(C).

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