Moduler les cotisations employeurs à l'assurance - chômage : les expériences de bonus - malus aux Etats-Unis

In this paper, we summarize the results of many studies concerning the policy of experience rating (the indexation of an employer's payroll tax rate to its past record of insured unemployment generation) in the United States, and present a few considerations relevant to the French case. We begin with a brief summary of the history of the policy, and then describe the three main methods by which it is implemented in the United States. We then discuss the theoretical models that have been used to analyze the impact of experience rating on unemployment. After describing the results of empirical analyzes performed on American data, we highlight the specificities of the French legislation and labor market that could influence the manner in which such a policy would work in France. Finally, we use INSEE data from the labor force survey (Enquête Emploi) to provide an empirical framework for discussion of the French situation.