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La privatisation par coupons dans l’ex-Tchécoslovaquie : analyse du mécanisme d’enchères et de ses résultats

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  • Olivier Bouin

    (CEFRES - Centre Français de Recherche en Sciences Sociales - MEAE - Ministère de l'Europe et des Affaires étrangères - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, OCDE - Organisation de Coopération et de Développement Economiques = Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development)

Abstract

En 1992, la Tchécoslovaquie aura attiré l'attention du monde entier. La préparation de la dissolution de l'Etat fédéral, devenue inexorable après les élections de juin 1992, a été suivie attentivement. De même, l'achèvement de la première vague de "grande" privatisation1 a suscité un intérêt important parmi les nombreux observateurs des processus de réforme des économies anciennement socialistes. Tout d'abord, l'allocation initiale des titres obtenue au terme des tours d'enchères marquera durablement la composition des actionnariats des entreprises privatisées. Ensuite, de nombreux théoriciens et praticiens de la transition ont considéré que le processus de privatisation devait être un processus générateur d'informations. Enfin, il est intéressant d'apprécier le rôle de la participation populaire dans la mise en oeuvre de la privatisation par coupons. Dans cette étude, O. Bouin analyse le processus d'enchères des actions de la privatisation par coupons de la manière suivante : il rappelle dans un premier chapitre les règles de fonctionnement du mécanisme utilisé dans le cadre de la privatisation par coupons et leur comparaison avec les fondements des mécanismes d'enchères d'inspiration walrassienne, puis détaille dans un second le déroulement des tours d'enchères en analysant plus spécifiquement le comportement du commissaire-priseur ainsi que les stratégies des DlKs et des FIPs. Dans un troisième chapitre, il se penche sur les questions relatives à la signification des résultats obtenus par le mécanisme d'enchères et au démarrage des structures d'échange des titres alloués lors des enchères.

Suggested Citation

  • Olivier Bouin, 1993. "La privatisation par coupons dans l’ex-Tchécoslovaquie : analyse du mécanisme d’enchères et de ses résultats," Post-Print halshs-01168370, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-01168370
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-01168370
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