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On Quitting Rights in Mechanism Design

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  • Olivier Compte

    (PJSE - Paris-Jourdan Sciences Economiques - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École des Ponts ParisTech - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, PSE - Paris School of Economics - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École des Ponts ParisTech - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement)

  • Philippe Jehiel

    (PJSE - Paris-Jourdan Sciences Economiques - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École des Ponts ParisTech - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, PSE - Paris School of Economics - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École des Ponts ParisTech - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement, Department of Economics - UCL - University College of London [London])

Abstract

Quitting rights play a major role in many economic interactions, whether in the precontractual phase or after contracts have been signed. Clearly, no party can be forced to sign a contract if she is unwilling to, thus implying that quitting rights can be exerted at the ex ante stage when no contract has been signed. But, quitting rights can also be exerted after explicit contracts have been signed in a number of instances. For example, most labor contracts allow employees to leave their job if they want to. Also, quitting rights may be asymmetric across agents as labor contracts illustrate. (Employers are generally constrained in their ability to replace their employees.)

Suggested Citation

  • Olivier Compte & Philippe Jehiel, 2007. "On Quitting Rights in Mechanism Design," Post-Print halshs-00754659, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00754659
    DOI: 10.1257/aer.97.2.137
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    Cited by:

    1. David Martimort & Aggey Semenov & Lars Stole, 2017. "A Theory of Contracts with Limited Enforcement," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 84(2), pages 816-852.
    2. Bester, Helmut & Krähmer, Daniel, 2012. "Exit options in incomplete contracts with asymmetric information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 147(5), pages 1947-1968.
    3. Bester, Helmut & Krähmer, Daniel, 2013. "Exit options and the allocation of authority," Discussion Papers 2013/5, Free University Berlin, School of Business & Economics.
    4. Bhaskar, Venkataraman, 2014. "The Ratchet Effect Re-examined: A Learning Perspective," CEPR Discussion Papers 9956, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    5. Chang, Dongkyu, 2021. "Optimal sales mechanism with outside options," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 195(C).
    6. McEvoy, David M. & McGinty, Matthew, 2023. "The problem of financing global public goods," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 153(C).
    7. Françoise Forges & Jérôme Renault, 2021. "Strategic information transmission with sender’s approval," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 50(2), pages 475-502, June.
    8. Stefano Galavotti & Nozomu Muto & Daisuke Oyama, 2011. "On efficient partnership dissolution under ex post individual rationality," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 48(1), pages 87-123, September.
    9. Ellman, Matthew & Hurkens, Sjaak, 2019. "Fraud tolerance in optimal crowdfunding," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 181(C), pages 11-16.
    10. Françoise Forges & Jérôme Renault, 2020. "Strategic information transmission with sender's approval," Working Papers hal-02440627, HAL.

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