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Incentives in some coalition formation games

Author

Listed:
  • Gabrielle Demange

    (PJSE - Paris-Jourdan Sciences Economiques - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École des Ponts ParisTech - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

The idea of using the core as a model for predicting the formation of coalitions and the sharing of benefits to coordinated activities has been studied extensively. Basic to the concept of the core is the idea of group rationality as embodied by the blocking condition. The predictions given by the core may run into difficulties if some individuals or coalitions may benefit from not blocking truthfully. This paper investigates this question in games in some games that generalize assignment games. Some positive results are given, and relationships with Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanisms are drawn.

Suggested Citation

  • Gabrielle Demange, 2005. "Incentives in some coalition formation games," Post-Print halshs-00670898, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00670898
    as

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