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Déterminants de la décision de consolider les filiales de financement : le cas de la France

Author

Listed:
  • Denis Cormier

    (UQAM - Université du Québec à Montréal = University of Québec in Montréal)

  • Paul André

    (UQAM - Université du Québec à Montréal = University of Québec in Montréal)

  • Emmanuelle Cargnello-Charles

    (UQAM - Université du Québec à Montréal = University of Québec in Montréal)

Abstract

Ces dernières années, le problème du financement hors bilan a été une préoccupation constante pour les organismes de normalisation de la comptabilité. L'objet de cette recherche est de comprendre les motivations des dirigeants d'entreprises par rapport à un certain type de financement hors bilan que constitue l'exclusion des filiales de financement du périmètre de consolidation. Nous étudions un échantillon de sociétés françaises cotées en Bourse pour lequel 39% des entreprises n'ont pas consolidé leurs filiales de financement. Cette pratique comptable est toujours permise dans plusieurs pays européens. Nos résultats montrent que le niveau d'endettement de l'entreprise, de même que sa taille et la structure de l'actionnariat sont déterminants dans la décision d'exclure les filiales de financement du périmètre de consolidation.

Suggested Citation

  • Denis Cormier & Paul André & Emmanuelle Cargnello-Charles, 2000. "Déterminants de la décision de consolider les filiales de financement : le cas de la France," Post-Print halshs-00587445, HAL.
  • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00587445
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00587445
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    References listed on IDEAS

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