Réductions d'impôts et dette publique en France
Author
Abstract
Suggested Citation
DOI: 10.3917/reof.116.0125
Download full text from publisher
To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:1. Check below whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
Other versions of this item:
- Muriel Pucci & Bruno Tinel, 2011. "Réductions d'impôts et dette publique en France," Revue de l'OFCE, Presses de Sciences-Po, vol. 0(1), pages 125-148.
- Muriel Pucci & Bruno Tinel, 2011. "Réductions d'impôts et dette publique en France," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00577770, HAL.
Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
Cited by:
- Karim Azizi & Nicolas Canry & Jean-Bernard Chatelain & Bruno Tinel, 2013.
"Government Solvency, Austerity and Fiscal Consolidation in the OECD: A Keynesian Appraisal of Transversality and No Ponzi Game Conditions,"
Working Papers
hal-00818474, HAL.
- Azizi, Karim & Canry, Nicolas & Chatelain, Jean-Bernard & Tinel, Bruno, 2013. "Government Solvency, Austerity and Fiscal Consolidation in the OECD: A Keynesian Appraisal of Transversality and No Ponzi Game Conditions," MPRA Paper 46519, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Karim Azizi & Nicolas Canry & Jean-Bernard Chatelain & Bruno Tinel, 2013. "Government Solvency, Austerity and Fiscal Consolidation in the OECD: A Keynesian Appraisal of Transversality and No Ponzi Game Conditions," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) hal-00818474, HAL.
- Karim Azizi & Nicolas Canry & Jean-Bernard Chatelain & Bruno Tinel, 2013. "Government Solvency, Austerity and Fiscal Consolidation in the OECD: A Keynesian Appraisal of Transversality and No Ponzi Game Conditions," Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne 13042, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne.
- Karim Azizi & Nicolas Canry & Jean-Bernard Chatelain & Bruno Tinel, 2013. "Government Solvency, Austerity and Fiscal Consolidation in the OECD: A Keynesian Appraisal of Transversality and No Ponzi Game Conditions," Papers 1304.7330, arXiv.org.
- Nicolas Canry & Jean-Bernard Chatelain & Bruno Tinel, 2013. "Government Solvency, Austerity and Fiscal Consolidation in the OECD: A Keynesian Appraisal of Transversality and No Ponzi Game Conditions," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00825446, HAL.
- Nicolas Canry & Jean-Bernard Chatelain & Bruno Tinel, 2013. "Government Solvency, Austerity and Fiscal Consolidation in the OECD: A Keynesian Appraisal of Transversality and No Ponzi Game Conditions," Post-Print halshs-00825446, HAL.
- Azizi, Karim & Canry, Nicolas & Chatelain, Jean-Bernard & Tinel, Bruno, 2013. "Government Solvency, Austerity and Fiscal Consolidation in the OECD: A Keynesian Appraisal of Transversality and No Ponzi Game Conditions," EconStor Preprints 72550, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics.
- Jean-Bernard Chatelain & Bruno Tinel & Karim Azizi & Nicolas Canry, 2012.
"Are the No-Ponzi Game and the Transversality Conditions Relevant for Public Debt? A Keynesian Appraisal,"
Post-Print
hal-00686788, HAL.
- Jean-Bernard Chatelain & Bruno Tinel & Karim Azizi & Nicolas Canry, 2012. "Are the No-Ponzi Game and the Transversality Conditions Relevant for Public Debt? A Keynesian Appraisal," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) hal-00686788, HAL.
- Karim Azizi & Nicolas Canry & Jean-Bernard Chatelain & Bruno Tinel, 2012. "Are No-Ponzi Game and Transversality Conditions Relevant for Public Debt? A Keynesian Appraisal," Working Papers wp296, Political Economy Research Institute, University of Massachusetts at Amherst.
- Jean-Bernard Chatelain & Bruno Tinel & Karim Azizi & Nicolas Canry, 2012. "Are the No-Ponzi Game and the Transversality Conditions Relevant for Public Debt? A Keynesian Appraisal," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) hal-00686788, HAL.
- repec:hal:journl:dumas-00834841 is not listed on IDEAS
More about this item
Keywords
public debt; tax cuts; stock-flow model; public finance; dette publique; baisse d'impôt; modèle stock-flux; finances publiques;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- E12 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - General Aggregative Models - - - Keynes; Keynesian; Post-Keynesian; Modern Monetary Theory
- E62 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Fiscal Policy; Modern Monetary Theory
- H63 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - Debt; Debt Management; Sovereign Debt
Statistics
Access and download statisticsCorrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00577770. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: CCSD (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/ .
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.