IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/hal/journl/halshs-00537858.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

The gamma-core of Cournot oligopoly TU-games with capacity constraints

Author

Listed:
  • Aymeric Lardon

    (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon - Saint-Etienne - ENS de Lyon - École normale supérieure de Lyon - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - UCBL - Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 - Université de Lyon - UJM - Université Jean Monnet - Saint-Étienne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

In cooperative Cournot oligopoly games, it is known that the alpha-core is equal to the beta-core, and both are non-empty if every individual profit function is continuous and concave (Zhao 1999b). Following Chander and Tulkens (1997), we assume that firms react to a deviating coalition by choosing individual best reply strategies. We deal with the problem of the non-emptiness of the induced core, the gamma-core, by two different approaches. The first establishes that the associated Cournot oligopoly TU(Transferable Utility)-games are balanced if the inverse demand function is differentiable and every individual profit function is continuous and concave on the set of strategy profiles, which is a step forward beyond Zhao's core existence result for this class of games. The second approach, restricted to the class of Cournot oligopoly TU-games with linear cost functions, provides a single-valued allocation rule in the gamma-core called NP(Nash Pro rata)-value. This result generalizes Funaki and Yamato's core existence result (1999) from no capacity constraint to asymmetric capacity constraints. Moreover, we provide an axiomatic characterization of this solution by means of four properties: efficiency, null firm, monotonicity and non-cooperative fairness.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Aymeric Lardon, 2010. "The gamma-core of Cournot oligopoly TU-games with capacity constraints," Post-Print halshs-00537858, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00537858
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
    1. Check below whether another version of this item is available online.
    2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
    3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

    Other versions of this item:

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Theo Driessen & Dongshuang Hou & Aymeric Lardon, 2011. "Stackelberg oligopoly TU-games: characterization of the core and 1-concavity of the dual game," Working Papers halshs-00610840, HAL.
    2. Stamatopoulos, Giorgos, 2018. "On the gamma-core of asymmetric aggregative games," MPRA Paper 88722, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    3. Meinhardt, Holger Ingmar, 2015. "The Incorrect Usage of Propositional Logic in Game Theory: The Case of Disproving Oneself," MPRA Paper 66637, University Library of Munich, Germany.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Game theory; Théorie des jeux;

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00537858. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: CCSD (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.