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Incomplétude stratégique dans les jeux de marchés compétitifs

Author

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  • Gaël Giraud

    (BETA - Bureau d'Économie Théorique et Appliquée - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - UNISTRA - Université de Strasbourg - UL - Université de Lorraine - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

We study the correlated equilibria of competitive strategic market games, i.e., games for which pure Nash equilibria exactly implement the Walrasian equilibria. We show that Arrow-Debreu economies are strategically incomplete, even if markets are complete (in the usual, non-strategic sense). Moreover, public correlated equilibria exactly coincide with sunspot (competitive) equilibria induced by the strategic incompleteness of markets. Finally, it is much more difficult to complete markets in the strategically incomplete case than in the usual GEI model.

Suggested Citation

  • Gaël Giraud, 1999. "Incomplétude stratégique dans les jeux de marchés compétitifs," Post-Print halshs-00499307, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00499307
    DOI: 10.2307/3502730
    as

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    Keywords

    Jeux de marchés;

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