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Stable pricing in monopoly and equilibrium-core of cost games

Author

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  • Vincent Iehlé

    (CERMSEM - CEntre de Recherche en Mathématiques, Statistique et Économie Mathématique - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

We prove the existence of subsidy free and sustainable pricing schedule in multiproduct contestable markets. We allow firms to discriminate the local markets that are composed by a set of the products line and a set of agents. Results are obtained under an assumption of fair sharing cost and under boundary condition of demand functions. The pricing problem is modelled in terms of equilibrium-core allocations of parameterized cost games.

Suggested Citation

  • Vincent Iehlé, 2004. "Stable pricing in monopoly and equilibrium-core of cost games," Post-Print halshs-00193961, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00193961
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00193961
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