IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/hal/journl/halshs-00008655.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Etude des déterminants de la prime d'acquisition d'un bloc de contrôle : le cas français

Author

Listed:
  • Alain Schatt

    (LEG - Laboratoire d'Economie et de Gestion - UB - Université de Bourgogne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Thierry Roy

    (LEG - Laboratoire d'Economie et de Gestion - UB - Université de Bourgogne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

Dans ce travail, nous vérifions si la prime payée lors de l'acquisition d'un bloc de contrôle dépend de la taille de ce dernier et de la détention préalable d'actions de l'entreprise par l'acquéreur du bloc. Nous testons nos hypothèses sur un échantillon de 80 opérations réalisées en France entre 1996 et 2002. Nos résultats montrent que la taille du bloc acquis a une incidence sur la prime payée par les acquéreurs. Par ailleurs, nous constatons qu'il y a lieu d'étudier séparément les opérations effectuées par les actionnaires possédant déjà une fraction des actions de l'entreprise et celles effectuées par de nouveaux actionnaires

Suggested Citation

  • Alain Schatt & Thierry Roy, 2005. "Etude des déterminants de la prime d'acquisition d'un bloc de contrôle : le cas français," Post-Print halshs-00008655, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00008655
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
    1. Check below whether another version of this item is available online.
    2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
    3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

    Other versions of this item:

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. de La Bruslerie, Hubert, 2013. "Equal opportunity rule vs. market rule in transfer of control: How can private benefits help to provide an answer?," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 23(C), pages 88-107.
    2. Hubert de La Bruslerie, 2010. "The Equal Opportunity Rule in Transfer of Control: A Contractual Model," Post-Print halshs-00636613, HAL.
    3. repec:dau:papers:123456789/3189 is not listed on IDEAS

    More about this item

    Keywords

    bloc de contrôle; prime de contrôle; identité des actionnaires;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00008655. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: CCSD (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.