How does the heterogeneity of institutional investors influence corporate tax avoidance? The moderating role of family ownership

This study provides new insights into the relationship between the heterogeneity of institutional investors (IIs) and corporate tax avoidance (CTA). It also investigates whether family ownership moderates this relationship. Based on a sample of 200 French-listed firms from 2008 to 2017, we use the generalized method of moment (GMM) estimator proposed by Arellano and Bover (1995) and developed by Blundell and Bond (1998) to address endogeneity and omitted variable concerns. The results show that passive IIs are associated with an increase in the level of tax avoidance. However, active ones significantly decrease the levels of tax avoidance practices. Moreover, we show that institutional activism is not sufficient to control managerial actions, particularly in the context of controlled family businesses. The results suggest that families may expropriate the rights of minority shareholders through a controlling coalition with passive IIs. This study has several practical implications. First, the results are useful for policymakers who should constrain passive IIs to provide only one service (asset management). Second, this study may sensitize family owners to the need to cooperate with active IIs that are effective in monitoring the firm. In particular, families should be willing to sacrifice some of their socioemotional wealth to promote a balanced ownership structure, which is important for responsible and effective corporate governance. This paper extends previous research by investigating the heterogeneity of IIs in terms of horizon, ownership and control. In addition, this paper sheds a new light on how family firms behave regarding tax avoidance practices in the presence of active and passive IIs.