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The Consequences of Regulating Agency Friction on an Optimal Contract

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  • Vincent Tena

    (DRM - Dauphine Recherches en Management - Université Paris Dauphine-PSL - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

This paper investigates the impact of changes in the intensity of moral hazard on the optimal provision of incentives during a contractual relationship. We develop a continuoustime principal-agent model in which the agent's benefit from diverting cash flow is subject to a persistent and exogenous shock. We interpret this shock as a new regulation that decreases the fraction of diverted cash flows accessible to the manager. Our results show that managerial compensation becomes compressed following such regulation, as an high-performing manager receives lower compensation, while an underperforming manager receives higher compensation. Furthermore, we demonstrate that this type of regulation leads to the over-retention of underperforming managers. Although reduced agency friction results in increased profitability, the unintended consequences of the regulation include higher compensation for underperformers and their over-retention. Nonetheless, we also show that a competitive labor market can help mitigate these adverse effects arising from a decrease in the severity of agency friction.

Suggested Citation

  • Vincent Tena, 2023. "The Consequences of Regulating Agency Friction on an Optimal Contract," Post-Print hal-04722609, HAL.
  • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-04722609
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-04722609v1
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    References listed on IDEAS

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