IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/hal/journl/hal-04558268.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Optimal make–take fees for market making regulation

Author

Listed:
  • Omar El Euch

    (CMAP - Centre de Mathématiques Appliquées de l'Ecole polytechnique - X - École polytechnique - IP Paris - Institut Polytechnique de Paris - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Thibaut Mastrolia

    (CMAP - Centre de Mathématiques Appliquées de l'Ecole polytechnique - X - École polytechnique - IP Paris - Institut Polytechnique de Paris - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Mathieu Rosenbaum

    (CMAP - Centre de Mathématiques Appliquées de l'Ecole polytechnique - X - École polytechnique - IP Paris - Institut Polytechnique de Paris - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Nizar Touzi

    (CMAP - Centre de Mathématiques Appliquées de l'Ecole polytechnique - X - École polytechnique - IP Paris - Institut Polytechnique de Paris - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

We address the mechanism design problem of an exchange setting suitable make– take fees to attract liquidity on its platform. Using a principal–agent approach, we provide the optimal compensation scheme of a market maker in quasi‐explicit form. This contract depends essentially on the market maker inventory trajectory and on the volatility of the asset. We also provide the optimal quotes that should be displayed by the market maker. The simplicity of our formulas allows us to analyze in details the effects of optimal contracting with an exchange, compared to a situation without contract. We show in particular that it improves liquidity and reduces trading costs for investors. We extend our study to an oligopoly of symmetric exchanges and we study the impact of such common agency policy on the system.

Suggested Citation

  • Omar El Euch & Thibaut Mastrolia & Mathieu Rosenbaum & Nizar Touzi, 2020. "Optimal make–take fees for market making regulation," Post-Print hal-04558268, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-04558268
    DOI: 10.1111/mafi.12295
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
    1. Check below whether another version of this item is available online.
    2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
    3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-04558268. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: CCSD (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.