IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/hal/journl/hal-04434018.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

CFO Pay Convexity, Risk Taking and Corporate Hedging

Author

Listed:
  • M. Barbi
  • Valentina Febo

    (Métis Lab EM Normandie - EM Normandie - École de Management de Normandie)

  • I. Massimiliani

Abstract

We study how a CFO's risk-taking incentives affect corporate hedging by utilising hand-collected data from 2009 to 2019 on corporate hedging and managerial compensation for a sample of US oil and gas firms. The relative convexity of CFO equity compensation negatively affects the likelihood and extent of hedging. When the CFO and CEO have diverging risk-taking incentives, the relative convexity of the CFO's equity payoff prevails over that of the CEO. This evidence underscores the primary role of the CFO in steering a firm's hedging strategy. \textcopyright 2023 John Wiley & Sons Ltd.

Suggested Citation

  • M. Barbi & Valentina Febo & I. Massimiliani, 2023. "CFO Pay Convexity, Risk Taking and Corporate Hedging," Post-Print hal-04434018, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-04434018
    DOI: 10.1111/eufm.12455
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
    1. Check below whether another version of this item is available online.
    2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
    3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-04434018. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: CCSD (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.