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Invisible Constitution as an instrument of consolidation of nation and defence of democracy

Author

Listed:
  • Yuri Barabash

    (Yaroslav Mudryi National Law University)

  • Darijus Beinoravičius

    (Mykolas Romeris University)

  • Juozas Valčiukas

    (Mykolas Romeris University)

Abstract

The paper's premise is that the invisible Constitution serves as an instrument to protect democracy and consolidate the nation. The discussion turns around the fundamental aspects of democracy and sovereignty to reveal the subject. The question which is particularly considered is how the Parliament and the Constitutional Court participate in the expression of the principles of democracy in the contemporary world. The paper concludes that the Parliament, through the formal legislative procedures, becomes less capable of achieving a social compromise. As a result, the same representative feature of democracy becomes more unpopular in society and continues to be a prevailing object of criticism among scholarly community. In contrast, the Constitutional Court's role in protecting democracy through the systematic interpretation of a constitution undergoes a profound change in the democratic world. Constitutional Court, through the understanding of both visible and invisible meaning of the Constitution turns it into an expression of the sovereign will of the permanent nation.

Suggested Citation

  • Yuri Barabash & Darijus Beinoravičius & Juozas Valčiukas, 2022. "Invisible Constitution as an instrument of consolidation of nation and defence of democracy," Post-Print hal-04242890, HAL.
  • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-04242890
    DOI: 10.9770/IRD.2022.4.3(7)
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-04242890
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    Keywords

    invisible Constitution; Democracy; Parliament; Constitutional Court; Sovereign;
    All these keywords.

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